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1963] RECENT DECISIONS 1359 
COURTS-SCOPE OF AUTHORITY-STERILIZATION OF MENTAL DEFECTIVES-
Respondent, age nineteen, appeared before the probate court of Muskingum 
County, Ohio, upon an affidavit1 filed by her mother alleging the child 
to be feeble-minded and in need of medical treatment.2 Results of psycho-
logical tests were presented at the hearing, revealing that respondent had an 
intelligence quotient of thirty-six and was therefore a feeble-minded person 
within the statutory definition.3 Respondent had had one illegitimate child, 
for whom she was unable to provide even rudimentary care or financial 
support, and was physically capable of bearing more children. Taking judi-
cial notice that the state mental hospitals were then overcrowded and un-
able to accommodate additional inmates, the probate court invoked its 
interim power to provide for the welfare of incompetents until they can 
be committed to an institution.• On order from the probate court, held, 
respondent will submit to a salpingectomy5 operation in an approved hos-
1 OHIO REv. CODE .ANN. § 5122.11 (Page Supp. 1962). 
2 See Newman, Sterili:ation: Pro and Con, Detroit Free Press, July 4, 1962, p. 7, 
col. 1. 
s OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 5125.24 (Page Supp. 1962). 
4 OHIO REv. CODE ANN, § 5125.!l0 (Page Supp. 1962), which provides: "If by reason 
of inability of the hospitals for the feeble-minded to receive additional patients and if 
[state authorities are] • • • unable to provide for the custody and care of any feeble-
minded person, the head of the hospital to which application is made shall forthwith 
notify the judge of the probate court in which the proceedings ••• are pending ...• 
The probate judge shall then take such action and make such order as he deems necessary 
and advisable to provide for the detention, supervision, care, and maintenance of said 
feeble-minded person • • • until such time as he may be received in a hospital for the 
feeble-minded." 
II Salpingectomy is the medical term for cutting the Fallopian tubes to effect female 
sterilization. 
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pital by a licensed physician. The legislative grant of plenary power at law 
and in equity,6 as well as the special interim authority to care for in-
competents, enable the probate court to provide extraordinary relief which 
takes into consideration the interests of both the incompetent and the 
community. In re Simpson, 180 N.E.2d 206 (Ohio P. Ct. 1962). 
The constitutionality of sterilization laws7 is no longer a debatable issue 
so long as procedural safeguards such as notice, hearing, and judicial review 
are provided for and observed.8 However, the significant feature of the 
principal case is that the state of Ohio has no such legislation. Thus, the 
court was forced to sustain its action on the basis of the statutory lan-
guage providing probate courts with interim supervisory power when the 
mental hospitals are overcrowded, and also on its general equity power. 
In considering the validity of the latter basis, it is necessary to examine 
the early pattern of control over incompetent persons. Originally in Eng-
land, the lord of the manor was entitled to the wardship of the land and 
person of those of unsound mind. However, because of frequent abuses of 
this power, control of idiots and lunatics become reposed in the crown, 
to the exclusion of the feudal lords.9 The King, as parens patriae, was in-
trusted with the care and custody of his insane subjects, but to avoid the 
burden of direct administration he delegated the duty to the chancellor, 
as keeper of the King's conscience.10 Thus, the lunatic became a ward of 
chancery by special royal commission and did not come within its 
6 Omo R.Ev. CoDE ANN. § 2101.24 (Page Supp. 1962), which provides: "Except as 
otherwise provided by law, the probate court has jurisdiction: .•• (F) To make in-
quests respecting lunatics, insane persons, idiots. . . . The probate court shall have 
plenary power at law and in equity to fully dispose of any matter properly before the 
court, unless the power is expressly otherwise limited or denied by statute." 
7 Early attempts at state-authorized sterilization bowed to a host of constitutional 
objections. An Indiana statute which allowed a board of examiners full discretion, 
within prescribed procedures, to determine if sterilization should be performed was 
held to be a violation of procedural due process because it failed to provide an avenue 
for judicial review. Williams v. Smith, 190 Ind. 526, 131 N.E. 2 (1921). See also Davis 
v. Berry, 216 Fed. 413 (S.D. Iowa 1914). In Osborn v. Thompson, 103 Misc. 23, 169 
, N.Y. Supp. 638 (Sup. Ct. 1918), statutory delegation of judicial power to a board whose 
duty was to determine if sterilization should be performed was declared to be contrary 
to the doctrine of separation of powers. Statutes providing for sterilization of criminals, 
epileptics and the feeble-minded confined in public institutions, but not providing the 
same for those kept elsewhere, were deemed arbitrary class legislation which denied equal 
protection of the laws guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment of the United States 
Constitution. Haynes v. Williams, 201 Mich. 138, 166 N.W. 938 (1918); Smith v. Board of 
Examiners, 85 N.J.L. 46, 88 Atl. 963 (1913). But see Smith v. Command, 231 Mich. 409, 
204 N.W. 140 (1925) (incompetent persons not an unreasonable classification denying 
equal protection); In re Main, 162 Okla. 65, 19 P .2d 153 (1933) (incompetent's right to 
procreativity subordinate to police power to legislate for general welfare). 
s E.g., Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200 (1927); State v. Troutman, 50 Idaho 673, 299 Pac. 
668 (1931); State ex rel. Smith v. Schaffer, 126 Kan. 607, 270 Pac. 604 (1928); see Comment, 
26 N.D.B. BRIEFS 183, 184 (1950). 
9 11 AMERICAN & ENGLISH ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW, Insanity § 3, at 114 n.3 (1890); 
l HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 473 (6th ed. 1938); MEGARRY & BAKER, SNELL'S 
PRINCIPLES OF EQUITY 493 (1954). 
10 3 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 427 (Wendell ed. 1854). 
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general equity jurisdiction.11 A landmark decision long ago put to rest 
any doubts as to the status of equity's power over incompetents.12 Indeed, 
the chancery court was unable even to appoint a guardian of the lunatic's 
person.13 Therefore, reliance on the traditional powers of equity in order-
ing sterilization of an incompetent is based on the erroneous assumption 
that courts of equity historically had jurisdiction of such persons.14 
The other alleged source of authority for the court's action in the prin-
cipal case is a statutory provision directing that the probate court shall 
intercede to provide for the "detention, supervision, care, and maintenance" 
of incompetents until admission to an institution is obtainable.111 Whether 
this legislation was intended to encompass sterilization orders is certainly 
debatable. Less than four months prior to this decision the Ohio legislature 
made substantial revisions in its mental health laws relating to the sub-
stantive rights of incompetent persons in commitment proceedings.16 It is 
certainly arguable that, if the legislature had intended to follow those states 
authorizing eugenic sterilization,17 it could easily have enacted appropriate 
legislation in the course of this statutory revision. Even a broad construc-
tion of the words "detention, supervision, care, and maintenance" does not 
seem to suggest that sterilization would fit compatibly within their scope. 
It is conceded that the notion of "care" encompasses providing for both 
physical and mental welfare. If a ward of the court required an appendec-
tomy or dental attention, for example, treatment could obviously be 
authorized.18 Likewise, if the incompetent's home environment caused 
frustration and anxiety, it would be appropriate remedial relief to place 
11 "The administration of idiots and lunatics' estates is, in virtue of a personal 
authority, committed by the crown, not the court of chancery, but to a certain great 
officer of the crown, not of necessity the person who has the custody of the great seal, 
though it generally attends him, by a warrant from the crown, which confers no 
jurisdiction, but only a power of administration." 2 MADDOCK, THE PRINCIPLES AND 
PRACTICE OF THE HIGH COURT OF CHANCERY 565-66 (1817). 
12 Beall v. Smith, L.R. 9 Ch. 85 (1873), where the court stated: "It is to be borne 
in -mind that unsoundness of mind gives the Court of Chancery no jurisdiction what-
soever. The Court of Chancery is not the curator either of the person or the estate 
of a person non compos mentis whom it does not and can not make its ward." Id. at 92. 
13 In re Bligh, 12 Ch. D. 364 (1879); In re Brandon's Trusts, 13 Ch. D. 773 (1879). 
14 In England today jurisdiction over incompetents is exercised by the Chancellor 
and the Lord Justices in Chancery. However, this result has been accomplished by 
modern statutory enactments. See 1 HOLDSWORTH, op. cit. supra note 9, at 476. 
111 Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 5125.30 (Page Supp. 1962). 
16 See generally Haines &: Myers, Hospitalization and Treatment of the Mentally Ill: 
Ohio's New Mental Health Law, 22 Omo ST. L.J. 659 (1961); Tuma, Civil Rights of the 
Mentally Ill in Ohio, 11 CLEV.-MAR. L. REv. 306 (1962). 
17 Alaska, Arizona, California, Connecticut, Delaware, Idaho, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, 
Maine, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Montana, Nebraska, New Hampshire, North 
Carolina, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon, South Carolina, South Dakota, Utah, Vermont, 
Virginia, ·west Virginia, Wisconsin. Four other states' sterilization laws have been declared 
unconstitutional and have not as yet been re-enacted in conformity with constitutional 
standards: Nevada, New Jersey, New York, 'Washington. See O'Hara &: Sanks, Eugenic 
Sterilization, 45 GEO. L.J. 20, 33 n.80 (1956). 
18 For cases where courts have ordered treatment for children over parental objection, 
see People ex rel. Wallace v. Labrenz, 411 Ill. 618, 104 N.E.2d 769 (1952) (blood transfu-
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him in a foster home. Assuming that the stigma of bearing illegitimate 
children would cause an incompetent to suffer mental frustration and 
trauma, the question remains whether the probate judge's order in the 
principal case was a reasonable exercise of the authority conferred by the 
legislature. Important is the fact that the probate court is given only interim 
authority in the limited situation where overcrowded conditions do not 
permit immediate hospital confinement. Sterilization is a drastic measure 
imposing permanent incapacity and is hardly warranted in a situation 
that is but the temporary concern of the court. This is especially true 
when reasonable alternatives such as closer parental supervision, juvenile 
probation, or private psychiatric care could be implemented while com-
mitment proceedings are pending. 
The court indicated that the salpingectomy operation would be not 
only for the respondent's health and welfare but also "for the benefit of 
society as a whole."19 The argument is frequently advanced that mental 
defects may be hereditary and thus increase the burden on society of caring 
for incompetents. However, it is by no means settled that defective parents 
are likely to procreate insane or incompetent children.20 Indeed, the field 
of genetics is so perplexed in its assertions as to the heritability of mental 
deficiencies that some professionals claim the scientific basis to be a myth.21 
If it is properly within judicial discretion to order eugenic sterilization 
simply to obviate a tax burden of providing support for the incompetent's 
potential issue, what is to preclude a judge from directing the same treat-
ment for those who must depend on public welfare assistance? And if such 
measures are proper in view of the societal economic interest, the basic 
principle might be extended to authorize abortions for women who are 
incompetent or indigent. The potential abuses associated with arbitrary 
judicial discretion in these matters are particularly magnified when the 
object of that discretion suffers from a mental handicap. Others of sounder 
mentality have the ability- to guard their rights and dignity. But the in-
competent and feeble-minded must depend largely on others for their 
protection. In the principal case the court even failed to appoint a guardian 
ad litem to represent the respondent's interests.22 In the field of criminal 
sion); In re Vasco, 238 App. Div. 128, 263 N.Y. Supp. 552 (1933) (removal of malignant 
eye); In the Matter of Rotkowitz, 175 Misc. 948, 25 N.Y.S.2d 624 (Dom. Rel. Ct. 1941); 
In re Weintraub, 166 Pa. Super. 342, 71 A.2d 823 (1950) (psychiatric treatment for 
delinquent). 
19 Principal case at 208. 
20 JENNINGS, THE BIOLOGICAL BASIS OF HUMAN NATURE 13 (1930) (stating that two 
feeble-minded parents may well have normal children). 
21 See DEUTSCH, THE MENTALLY ILL IN AMERICA 372 (1937); Cook, Eugenics or 
Euthenics, 37 ILL. L. REv. 287, 295-98 (1943); Landman, The History of Human Steriliza-
tion in the United States-Theory, Statute, Adjudication, 23 ILL. L. REV. 463 (1929); 
Myerson, Certain Medical and Legal Phases of Eugenic Sterilization, 52 YALE L.J. 618 
(1943). But see GOSNEY &: POPENOE, STERILIZATION FOR Hu;,.IAN BETTERMENT (1938). 
22 OHIO REv. CODE ANN.§ 2111.23 (Page 1954), which provides: "In a suit or proceed-
ing in which the guardian has an adverse interest, the court shall appoint a guardian 
ad !item to represent such minor or other person under legal disability." 
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law, there is substantial authority for the proposition that failure of a 
state court to appoint counsel for a youthful or incompetent defendant is 
a deprivation of rights essential to a fair hearing.28 Surely an incompetent 
is entitled to due process of law whether a court is administering civil or 
criminal justice. Indeed, in juvenile court proceedings, which are closely 
analogous because of the absence of criminal sanctions, the right of the 
minor to be represented by counsel is recognized.24 At least one federal 
court of appeals has squarely held that in commitment proceedings due 
process requires that the incompetent be represented by counsel, and the 
failure of the court to make such an appointment is reversible error.25 
To sustain such extensive discretion as was asserted by the court in the 
principal case is not only dangerous as a precedent but it would render 
any notion of inherent limits on a judge's power illusory. Interpreting and 
applying the law is a proper judicial function, but the responsibility for 
lawmaking rests basically with the legislature.26 Certainly statutory inter-
pretation is not confined to the most strict and literal construction of the 
language possible. Such an approach would seriously impair effective 
government and impose an onerous burden on the legislature. Because 
statutes operate prospectively they must to some degree speak in general 
terms. It is the judge's function to apply the legislative policy to the myriad 
of factual situations that arise in litigation. If courts had to find an express 
legislative mandate for every case, adjudication would virtually come to a 
standstill. Indeed, settling disputes in court would become unnecessary be-
cause the legislature would make the rule for each circumstance. Even if 
28 See Moore v. Michigan, 355 U.S. 155 (1957); Massey v. Moore, 348 U.S. 105 (1954); 
De Meerleer v. Michigan, 329 U.S. 663 (1947); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932). 
The cases where failure to appoint counsel was held not to be a violation of due 
process under the "special circumstances" test are readily distinguishable from the prin• 
cipal case because the inability of the youthful and mentally retarded girl to represent 
herself before the court is undeniable. 
24 In McDaniel v. Shea, 278 F.2d 460 (D.C. Cir. 1960), a case in a juvenile court which 
involved commitment of a minor to an institution, the court said: "We think the 
appellant needed a lawyer. Her status was, to say the least, in doubt, and she was 
in jeopardy. 'With her liberty in the balance, the assistance of counsel might well have 
furthered the best interests both of the child and of the authorities responsible in this 
delicate area of social welfare." Id. at 462. See also Shioutakon v. District of Columbia, 
236 F.2d 666, 669 (D.C. Cir. 1956). 
2r; Dooling v. Overholser, 243 F.2d 825 (D.C. Cir. 1957); Howard v. Overholser, 130 
F.2d 429, 434 (D.C. Cir. 1942). 
20 Whether t11e court in applying the law to a specific factual situation is creating 
law or merely interpreting it remains a topic of dispute. For a treatment of the historical 
interpretative view, see 1 BLACKSTONE, op. cit. supra note 10, at 69; CARDozo, THE NATURE 
OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 124-25, 136-37 (1922); CARTER, LAw: ITS ORIGIN, GROWTH AND 
FUNCTION 235 (190i); HALE, HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW 67 (4th ed. 1739). For writers 
supporting the creative view, see AUSTIN, LECTURES ON JURISPRUDENCE 224 (4th ed. 1873); 
BENTHAM, A COMMENT ON THE COMMENTARIES 190 (Everett ed. 1928); GRAY, NATURE AND 
SOURCES OF LAw 84, 95, 170-72 (1909). While the basis of dispute is largely rhetorical, the 
predominant understanding today is that the judge does engage in the lawmaking process. 
The source of difficulty really goes to the scope and extent of such power. BODENHEIMER, 
JURISPRUDENCE 382 (1962). 
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the enormous task of constantly revising the law was administratively fea-
sible, the rule would often result only after the harm had been done. Thus, 
the judicial function necessarily involves substantial discretion, but a 
corollary to this is that the courts must act responsibly so as not to abuse 
the power entrusted to them. Surely cases may arise where the social in-
terest dictates that the judge "strike a path along new courses.''27 However, 
the invisible restraints of precedent and custom "hedge and circumscribe 
his action.''28 He is not possessed with broad, far-reaching power to initiate 
new policies or to design a legal order to his liking. In the tradition of the 
democratic process the making of major revisions of law roust be left to 
those entrusted with the task of legislating.29 Principles such as these have 
direct relevance to the circumstances of the principal case. No court of 
record30 has ever asserted power to order the sterilization of incompetent 
persons in the absence of express legislative authorization. It is difficult, 
if not impossible, to avoid the conclusion that this court has simply con-
jured up a novel power without historical or statutory basis. 
27 CAru>ozo, op. cit. supra note 26, at 112-14. 
28 Ibid. 
29 See BonENHEIMER, op. cit. supra note 26, at 380-86. 
William R. Warnock 
ao The opinion in the principal case does allude to an unpublished Maryland circuit 
court memorandum stating that a sterilization decree "could be made under the general 
equity powers of the court." Principal case at 208. 
